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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

: Case No. 890081-CA

vs.

:

JOHN TIMOTHY SINGER,

: Category No. 2

Defendant/Appellant

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction and final judgment
entered against Defendant in Third Judicial District Court, in
and for Summit County, the Honorable Michael Murphy, Judge,
presiding.

On December 22, 1988, Defendant was found guilty by a

jury of the offense of Criminal Homicide, Manslaughter, a second
degree felony, as described in Utah Code Ann. §76-5-205 (1990).
Sentence was imposed on January 26, 1989.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Was the evidence presented at trial insufficient to

convict the Defendant of the offense of Manslaughter?
The standard of review is that the Court views all the
evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, and
will only reverse when the evidence is so inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained

a reasonable doubt as to a defendant's guilt.
709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985);

State v. Booker,

State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217,

218-219 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (1988).
2.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in

denying Defendant's motion to suppress statements he made to law
enforcement agents?
An appellate court "will reverse the trial court's
finding of a valid waiver [of Miranda rights] only if that
finding is clearly in error or the court has abused its
discretion."

State v. Heqelman, 717 P.2d 1348, 1349 (Utah 1986)

(citing State v. Meinhart, 617 P.2d 355 (Utah 1980)).
As to the voluntariness of a confession, "it is the
duty of an appellate court . . . to examine the entire record and
make an independent determination of the ultimate issue of
voluntariness."

State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 464 n.76 (Utah

1988)(quoting Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 348
(1976)(citation omitted)).

See also State v. Carter, 776 P.2d

886, 890 & n.ll (Utah 1989)(citing Bishop, 753 P.2d at 464 &
n.76).

However, in reviewing the findings of fact that underpin

the trial court's decision, the appellate court determines
whether the lower court "abused its discretion in assessing the
evidence presented and drawing a reasonable conclusion
therefrom."

Carter, 776 P.2d at 890.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution:
No person shall be . . . compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. . . .

Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution:
In criminal prosecutions the accused . .
• . shall not be compelled to give evidence
against himself.
Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, Utah
Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1990):
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder
in the second degree if the actor:
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes
the death of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily
injury to another, he commits an act
clearly dangerous to human life that
causes the death of another;
(c) acting under circumstances
evidencing a depraved indifference to
human life, he engages in conduct which
creates a grave risk of death to
another and thereby causes the death of
another; or . . .
Criminal Homicide, Manslaughter, Utah Code Ann. §76-5205(1) (1990):
Criminal homicide constitutes
manslaughter if the actor:
(a) recklessly causes the death of
another; or
(b) causes the death of another under
the influence of extreme emotion disturbance
for which there is a reasonable explanation
or excuse; or
(c)causes the death of another under
circumstances where the actor reasonably
believes the circumstances provide a legal
justification or excuse for his conduct
although the conduct is not legally
justifiable or excusable under the existing
circumstances.
Criminal Homicide, Negligent Homicide, Utah Code Ann.
§76-5-206(1):
Criminal homicide constitutes negligent
homicide if the actor, acting with criminal
negligence, causes the death of another.
Recklessness, Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(3):

Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect
to circumstances surrounding his conduct or
the result of his conduct when he is aware of
but consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances
exist or the result will occur. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that its
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from
the standard of care that an ordinary person
would exercise under all the circumstances as
viewed from the actor's standpoint.
Criminal Negligence, Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(4):
With criminal negligence or is
criminally negligent with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the
result of his conduct when he ought to be
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the circumstances exist or the result
will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that the failure to
perceive it constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care than an ordinary
person would exercise in all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant, his brother-in-law Addam Swapp, and
Addam's brother, Jonathan Swapp, were jointly charged with one
count of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, a
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1990) (R. 2-5). Trial
commenced on November 25, 1988, in Summit County, Utah (R. 746).
The jury returned its verdicts on December 22, 1988 (R. 990-993).
Defendant and Addam Swapp were convicted of the lesser and
included offense of Criminal Homicide, Manslaughter, a violation
of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-205 (1990) (R. 1092, 1094).

Jonathan

Swapp was convicted of Negligent Homicide, a violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-206 (1990) (R. 1093).

On January 26, 1989, the

Defendant was sentenced to the indeterminate term as provided by

law of not less than one nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison, to commence at the end of his federal sentence and
be served consecutively thereto (R. 1417-1421).

Addam Swapp was

similarly sentenced to 1-15 years in prison consecutive to his
federal sentence (R. 1422-1426).

Jonathan Swapp was sentenced

for the Class A misdemeanor offense of Negligent Homicide to one
year in jail consecutive to his federal sentence (R. 1427-1431).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the early morning hours of January 16, 1988, Max
Lewis, who resided across the street from the Marion Stake
Center, in Marion, Utah, was awakened by a loud noise and the
shaking of his house (Tr. 12-2, pp. 88) . Later that morning,
when he went to the parking lot of the Stake Center to plow snow,
Lewis noticed that the building had been severely damaged (Tr.
12-2, pp. 88-89).

Detective Robert Berry of the Summit County

Sheriff's Office responded to the scene and located a large
carved pole that had been wired to a fence on the east side of
the Stake Center.

The pole had been painted red and bore an

inscription (Tr. 12-2, pp. 95-96).
Near the pole, Detective Berry observed a trail in the
snow.

It consisted of several footprints proceeding in an east-

west direction.

He followed the trail through a field and

ultimately to the property occupied by the extended family of
Vickie Singer (Tr. 12-2, pp. 96-97).

Officers did not enter that

Singer property (Tr. 12-2, p. 103). This was because several
months earlier, on October 29, 1987, Summit County Sheriff Fred
Transcript references refer to the date the evidence was taken.

Eley had been ordered off the property by Addam Swapp, who had
pointed handguns in the direction of the sheriff and a deputy,
and fired a shot into the air as the officers were leaving,
warning them not to come onto the property again (Tr. 12-2, pp.
120-123).

On the same day, Deputy Joe Offret of the Summit

County Sheriff's Office contacted Addam Swapp by phone, who
reiterated his earlier warning, stating that if officers came on
to the property blood would be spilled and it wouldn't be his
(Tr. 12-2, 138-141).
After Detective Berry followed the footprints to the
Singer property, federal authorities were contacted (Tr. 12-2,
pp. 102-103).

F.B.I. Agent Calvin Clegg was able to make

telephonic contact with the Addam Swapp, who did not deny his
involvement in the bombing.

Swapp quoted extensively from

scripture and indicated that his God was angry, stating that the
scriptures were replete with references that God would pour out
his wrath against the people who strike out against the Church of
God (Tr. 12-2, PP. 156-157).

Clegg informed Addam Swapp that the

property was surrounded and that law enforcement wanted a
peaceful solution (Tr. 12-2, p. 158). Clegg told Swapp he was
concerned about the children (Tr. 12-2, p. 158). Swapp told
Clegg that he had expected the confrontation and that the family
was prepared for a siege and could hold out for months (Tr. 12-2,
p. 158). After a 19-minute discussion, Swapp terminated the
conversation (Tr. 12-2, pp. 158-159).
The day after the bombing, Addam Swapp telephoned Chad
Gibbs, a news reporter for KUTV news in Salt Lake City.

Swapp

acknowledged he had left at the site of the bombing a red pole
which included the inscription "Church, state and nation shall
now be destroyed" (Tr. 12-2, pp. 203-205).

In his prepared

statement, Swapp made scriptural references to the Lord fighting
their battles and the sword falling on their enemies (Tr. 12-2,
p. 208).
Over the ensuing thirteen days numerous federal law
enforcement agents were assigned to the standoff at Marion, Utah.
Due to the presence of a number of young children (Exhibit P-19),
strict rules of engagement were imposed upon the officers.

Under

no circumstances was the Singer residence to be fired upon, even
if officers themselves were under fire from the house (Tr. 12-2,
pp. 234-235).
At various times throughout the standoff, law
enforcement authorities set up lights and played loud noises
through speaker systems.

The speakers were not used until

approximately one week into the standoff (Tr. 12-5, p. 98; Tr.
12-14, p. 219). The placement of the lights and speakers was
undertaken at the suggestion of Duane Fuselier, an F.B.I. Agent
and psychologist who was brought to the scene to help bring a
peaceful end to the crisis.

He suggested the use of the lights

for security and tactical reasons, and felt the noise would be a
way of prodding the family to at least communicate with the
officers (Tr. 12-5, pp. 97-98).
Throughout the standoff, Addam and Jonathan Swapp
openly carried firearms when they were outside the residence
(Tr. 12-5, pp. 7-8, 26-28, 30-31, 39-47) (Exhibits 12 to 19).

Firearms were discharged from the Singer property on numerous
occasions.

Several times rounds were fired from the Singer

residence and elsewhere at lights, generators and other equipment
set up to assist in the effort to bring the standoff to an end.
At times, shots were fired at positions occupied by federal
officers (Tr. 12-5, pp. 8-9, 15-16; Tr. 12-2, 248-249, Tr. 12-7,
pp. 235-236).

On two occasions, Jonathan Swapp pointed his

rifle in the direction of F.B.I, agents (Tr. 12-2, p. 251; Tr.
12-5, p. 47). On one occasion, an F.B.I, agent observed
Defendant John Timothy Singer outside the back door of the Singer
house in his wheelchair in possession of a rifle (Tr. 12-5, p.
44).
Authorities continued to try to negotiate with the
occupants of the property.

On January 20, 1988, a letter from

the ATF Special Agent in charge, Nolan Douglas, was dropped onto
the property from a helicopter (Tr. 12-2, pp. 219-220).

The

letter stated that Addam Swapp and Vickie Singer had been
indicted by a federal grand jury, that arrest warrants were
outstanding for the two, and that a federal judge had ordered
them to immediately come out.

Douglas expressed concern for the

family, especially the children, and encouraged the family to
pick up the telephone and talk to work the situation out
peacefully (Exhibit C-2).

The family gave no response to

Douglas' letter (Tr. 12-14, p. 228).
On January 25, 1988, Ogden Kraut, a friend of the
Singer family, was allowed onto the property to act as an
intermediary (Tr. 12-5, pp. 231-234).

He went in on three

occasions.

On his first visit, Kraut asked Addam Swapp why he

had guns, and if he intended to shoot anyone.
"No, not unless they come over the fence."

Swapp responded,

He told Kraut that

part of his revelation was that there would be a confrontation
and bloodshed there (Tr. 12-5, p. 242), and that the family was
expecting John Singer to be resurrected from the dead as a result
of the confrontation with the authorities (Tr. 12-5, p. 239).
The following day, on January 26, 1988, ten days into
the standoff, the authorities had Kraut deliver a letter from
Utah Governor Norman Bangerter to the family, urging the
occupants to peacefully end the standoff, if only for the sake of
the small children who were inside the Singer residence with the
Defendants (Exhibit C-8).

Kraut described Addam as being armed

like a "Mexican bandito" with a band of bullets across his chest
and waist, a pistol on each side, a long knife and a rifle.
Kraut told Addam Swapp it was not his mission to make war (Tr.
12-5, p. 251).

Kraut returned the next day, January 27, 1988,

and was given handwritten letters to the Governor from Defendant
Addam Swapp and from Vickie Singer (Tr. 12-5, pp. 260-262).

On

either his second or third visit, Kraut told Addam Swapp that he
would "either have a big revelation up here or a catastrophe," to
which Swapp responded, "That's right." (Tr. 12-5, p. 253)
In his letter to the Governor, Addam Swapp stated that
he did not recognize the authority of the government, and
declared the Singer property an independent nation.

He commanded

law enforcement to leave the valley immediately, threatening
destruction in the name of the Lord.

In the P.S. to the letter

he stated:

"TAKE A WARNING - any man of yours who attempts to

cross the Boundaries of this place, without our Permission, will
be treated as an agressive [sic] act on your part against us and
we will defend ourselves in any manner we see fit. • . ."
(Exhibit C-9, page 6) (Tr. 12-5, pp. 114-120).
Discouraged by the letters they received, officers
decided to attempt an arrest.

Their belief was that Addam Swapp

was the leader on the property (Tr. 12-5, p. 141), and that if he
was captured, the other family members would surrender and the
standoff would end, which proved prophetic (Tr. 12-5, pp. 123125; Tr. 12-14, p. 274-275).
The first arrest plan involved the use of the noise
producing speakers as decoys.

The agents were aware that when

noise had previously been broadcast, the Swapp brothers would
venture off the property and disable the speakers by firing into
them.

Members of the F.B.I. Hostage Rescue Team and Utah State

Corrections Department dog handlers would be in the area when the
Swapp brothers left the property.

The dogs would be released and

take down the Swapp brothers (Tr. 12-5, p. 289-292).

When the

speakers were activated the Swapp brothers did respond as
anticipated (Tr. 12-5, pp. 298-299).

However, when the dogs were

released they did not attack the Swapp brothers.

One of the dogs

began to attack one of the agents, the other ran a few yards and
returned to his handler.

After disabling the speakers by

shooting them with firearms, the Swapps retreated to the Singer
house (Tr. 12-7, pp. 232-233, 251).

In conjunction with this first plan, several F.B.I,
agents assigned to the Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) and Corrections
dog handler Fred House had entered the house on the west side of
the Singer property, known as the Bates house, at about 10:00
p.m. on January 27 (Tr. 12-7, pp. 9-10).

Agents had previously

observed family members, including the Swapp brothers, enter the
house during the previous twelve days.

In the event that the

Swapp brothers entered the Bates house on the morning of the
28th, agents would be in a position to effect an arrest (Tr. 125, p. 291).
When the first arrest attempt failed, a second plan was
put into effect.

The agents were aware that the Swapp brothers

went to milk the family goat every morning.

The goat pen was

located approximately one-half way between the Bates and Singer
houses.

The new plan was to release the dogs from the front door

of the Bates house as the Swapp brothers left the goat pen.

The

dogs were to take the Swapps to the ground, after which the
officers would move in and effect the arrest without the
necessity of firing a shot (Tr. 12-6, pp. 37, 41).
At about 8:30 a.m. on January 28, 1988, Addam and
Jonathan Swapp left the Singer house to milk the goat.
both were armed.

As usual,

Utah Department of Corrections dog handlers

Jerry Pope and Fred House moved to the front door of the Bates
house when the Swapp brothers approached the goat pen (Tr. 12-6,
vol II, p. 76). After they finished the milking, they began
walking from the goat pen located midway between the Bates home
and the Singer house towards the Singer house.

The door was

opened and the dogs were released.

At that time, F.B.I, agents

John Butler and Martin Brown were positioned behind Pope and
House to provide cover (Tr. 12-7, pp. 150-151).

Butler and Brown

were armed with 9mm rifles (Tr. 12-7, p. 134). Agents David
Edward and Richard Intellini, also armed, were lying prone on a
second floor landing of the Bates house looking out a window that
faced the Singer house (Tr. 12-7, pp. 22-24).
As the dogs were released, Lt. House was crouched
slightly in the doorway with his right side exposed to the Singer
house (Tr. 12-7, p. 184). Shortly after the dogs were released,
gunfire erupted from the Singer house.
was fired (Exhibit E-4).

A volley of three shots

Almost simultaneously, agents in the

Bates house observed Addam Swapp pull his 30-06 rifle off his
shoulder, spin around to face the Bates house, and bring his
rifle into a firing position.

Agents Butler and Intellini each

fired one shot almost simultaneously at Addam Swapp, who fell to
the ground (Tr. 12-7, pp. 156-160; Tr. 12-6, p. 94; Tr. 12-7, p.
29).

Agent Butler's round entered Addam Swapp's wrist, traveled

through his arm into his chest and lodged in his back (Tr. 12-14,
pp. 86-90).

Agent Intellini's round struck the inside of a

window frame in the Bates house (Tr. 12-6, p. 95).
After firing his shot, Agent Butler grabbed Pope and pulled him
to safety into the stairwell (Tr. 12-7, p. 160).
Just after the agents fired, a series of four and then
three rounds (Exhibit E-4) were fired from the Singer house and
the northeast corner of the house.

Just before the last volley,

F.B.I. Agent Hal Metcalf, who was looking out a window in the

Jepsen home to the west of the Bates house, saw Jonathan Swapp
kneeling at the northeast corner of the Singer house, pointing a
rifle in his direction.

Agent Metcalf dove for cover as rounds

hit the Jepsen home (Tr. 12-7, p. 205; Tr. 12-8, p. 17).
Shortly after the gunfire erupted, agents noticed that
Fred House had been hit and had slumped to the ground (Tr. 12-6,
vol. II, p. 37). Agent Intellini called out to him to hold on,
that they'd get him out of there (Tr. 12-6, p. 96). The dogs,
who had become disoriented and apparently never keyed on the
Swapp brothers, re-entered the Bates house as Agent Hugh McKinney
made his way down the stairs to give House first aid (Tr. 12-7,
pp. 29-30).

About that same time more shots were hitting the

partially open front door (Tr. 12-7, pp. 99-100).

Lt. House had

slumped back into a closet near the doorway with his feet
blocking the doorway (Tr. 12-7, p. 162). While making his way to
Lt. House, McKinney, lying prone, heard the snap of bullets
passing over his head (Tr. 12-7, P. 113). McKinney managed to
pull Lt. House's feet from in front of the door and Butler was
able to close it with the handle of a mop (Tr. 12-7, p. 100).
Once the door was closed no more rounds entered the Bates house.
McKinney administered first aid to Lt. House, but he did not
respond (Tr. 12-7, pp. 101-102).
After the shooting stopped, Addam Swapp, who was
wounded and had retreated into the Singer house, was observed
approaching the Bates house unarmed (Tr. 12-7, pp. 241-242).
Agents ordered him to lie on the ground where he was given
medical attention (Tr. 12-7, pp. 264-270, 171-172).

At about the

same time, armored personnel carriers (APCs) entered the
property.

One blocked the northwest window of the Singer house

from which shots were fired, where Agent Dave Shepherd observed
Defendant Singer through the window (Tr. 12-7, pp. 68-69).

The

other APC used to evacuate the injured Fred House (Tr. 12-6, p.
24), after which the APC returned and was used to evacuate Addam
Swapp to a nearby ambulance (Tr. 12-7, 172-173).

Shortly

afterwards, F.B.I, agents received a telephone call from Jonathan
Swapp, who had hooked up the phone again.

Jonathan indicated

that the family was willing to surrender (Tr. 12-5, pp. 124-126).
Thereafter, Jonathan Swapp, together with Defendant John Timothy
Singer and the other members of the Singer family left the house
and surrendered themselves to federal custody.

When he

surrendered, Defendant Singer had 2 gun holsters strapped to his
wheelchair (Tr. 12-9, p. 67).
Lt. Fred House was pronounced dead on arrival at the
University of Utah Medical Center on January 28, 1988 (Tr. 12-8,
p. 145). The State Medical Examiner, Dr. Edwin Sweeney,
testified that Lt. House died as a result of a single gunshot
wound to his chest (Tr. 12-8, p. 153). The projectile entered
Lt. House's chest directly below the right nipple and travelled
backward and downward from right to left (Tr. 12-8, p. 151). The
projectile nicked the aorta, which caused the death (Tr. 12-8, p.
152).
Ten expended .30 caliber bullets were recovered after
the shooting (Exhibits B-l through B-9, and B-37).

Seven were

fired from Defendant John Timothy Singer's Plainfield carbine
(Tr. 12-13, p. 273), which was located on a table in Defendant
Singer's bedroom at the north end annex of the Singer house (Tr.
12-13, pp. 157-159).

That Plainfield .30 caliber carbine had

been purchased from a gun shop in West Valley City by Defendant
Singer in January of 1988, after which he took the rifle back to
the gun shop for repair and picked it up shortly before the
church was bombed (Tr. 12-9, pp. 90-92, 98-103).
Of the seven rounds fired from Defendant Singer's
rifle, one was recovered from the floor of the Bates house in the
same location where HRT members had removed Lt. House's clothing
and administered first aid (Tr. 12-7, p. 289). A substance found
on that projectile tested positive for type 0 human blood,
consistent with the blood found on the shirt of the victim (Tr.
12-8, pp. 58-61).

Another round was found in the jacket of

F.B.I. Agent Don Roberts, who was in the Jepsen home when the
shooting started and was hit by a round, but not injured because
he was wearing a bullet-proof vest (Tr. 12-8, p. 17-32).

Four

other rounds were recovered from inside the Bates house (Tr. 127, pp. 282-290; Tr. 12-8, pp. 73-74).

A seventh round was taken

from a vehicle which was parked in the driveway of the Jepsen
house during the shooting (Tr. 12-8, pp. 12-13).
Two .30 caliber rounds fired from Jonathan Swapp's
Alpine carbine were recovered from the Jepsen garage (Tr. 12-7,
p. 296;

Tr. 12-8, p. 7; Tr. 12-13, p. 265). A third round was

recovered from a first floor ceiling joist in the Bates house

(Tr. 12-8, pp. 186-189).

Two expended .30 caliber casings which

had been ejected from the Alpine carbine were found on the ground
in the snow at the northeast corner of the Singer house in the
area where Agent Metcalf had seen Jonathan Swapp kneel and point
his rifle (Tr. 12-8, p. 183). Firearms identification and
trajectory analysis evidence revealed that the rounds fired from
the Alpine rifle at the northeast corner of the Singer house went
through the doorway of the Bates house, passed through the narrow
corridor where the agents were scrambling for cover, exited
through a rear window, and ultimately lodged where they were
found in the garage of the Jepsen house (Tr. 12-13, pp. 256-257).
After the occupants surrendered, search warrants were
executed on the Singer property and structures, including the
Singer house.

The agents searching that house discovered a

virtual arsenal in that dwelling (Exhibit D-6.2).

Firearms and

ammunition were found in positions close to windows and makeshift
gun ports. A total of twenty-three handguns, shotguns and
rifles, including Defendant Singer's Plainfield .30 caliber
carbine and Jonathan Swapp's Alpine .30 cal. carbine (from which
the rounds were earlier fired) were recovered from the residence
and property (Tr. 12-13, pp. 132-187).

Several of the rifles,

including the Plainfield and Alpine .30 caliber carbines, were
recovered from Defendant Singer's bedroom at the north annex of
the Singer house (Exhibit P-44).

Eight thousand three hundred

and four (8,304) rounds of ammunition were found stacked in
places within the residence where they could be easily reached

for reloading (Tr. 12-13, p. 186; Tr. 12-14, p. 261).

Of the

twenty-three firearms recovered, twenty-one were fully
functional, seventeen were loaded when seized, and sixteen had no
safety or had the safeties off (Tr. 12-13, pp. 132-187).
Swapp's .30-06 was found where he had fallen.

Addam

It was loaded,

with one round chambered and seven rounds in the clip.

The

safety was off (Tr. 12-13, pp. 172-173).
Following his arrest, Defendant Singer was given a
Miranda warning, waived his rights, and gave a statement to
officers wherein he admitted that he was seated in his wheelchair
in his bedroom looking out his window in the Singer home when
Addam and Jonathan Swapp went out to milk the goat on January 28,
1988.

He said that when he saw dogs running from the Bates house

he grabbed his rifle and fired at the dogs.

He denied firing at

any people (Tr. 12-9, pp. 55-81; Exhibit E-7).
Additional facts upon which the State relies in support
of its arguments are presented throughout the argument portion of
this brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Evidence at trial was sufficient to establish all

elements of the offense of manslaughter.

The Defendant requested

and received a lesser included instruction concerning negligent
homicide, which was rejected by the jury.

When placed in

context, the Defendant's actions, in firing his rifle repeatedly
in the direction of officers who were attempting to arrest Addam
and Jonathan Swapp, and which firing resulted directly in the

death of Officer Fred House, was at a minimum reckless,
supporting his conviction for manslaughter.
2.

The trial court properly denied the Defendant's

motion to suppress statements he made to law enforcement
officers.

Such statements were made after he was fully advised

of his Miranda warning and waived his rights.

The one time that

he indicated he did not feel like talking anymore, the officers
scrupulously honored his request and asked him no more questions
concerning the events in question.

After a three minute casual

conversation which was not interrogation or its functional
equivalent, the Defendant himself re-initiated further discussion
by telling the agents that maybe he would tell them the whole
story.

The trial court found that the agents used no trickery or

coercion, made no promises or threats, and that the Defendant's
statements were freely and voluntarily made after a complete
advisement and waiver of his rights.

The record supports the

trial court's ruling.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR MANSLAUGHTER.
Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence
to convict him of manslaughter, and urges this Court to lower the
level of his conviction to negligent homicide, a class A
misdemeanor.

The standard of review is that the Court views all

the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, and
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Swapp went out to milk the goat (Tr. 12-9, p. 64). Earlier that
morning, police dogs had been sent in an effort to arrest Addam
and Jonathan Swapp, and the Defendant was aware of that incident
(Tr. 12-9, p. 63). The Defendant was armed with his .30 caliber
carbine rifle, which was loaded with ten rounds.

He was familiar

with the rifle and knew that if loaded to its 15-round capacity
it would jam (Tr. 12-9, p. 65). This was the same rifle he had
purchased shortly before the standoff began, and which he had
taken back to the gun shop for repairs, insisting that he needed
it back before the weekend (of the bombing) (Tr. 12-9, pp. 90-92,
98-103).

Although his view to the west was partially blocked by

a pine tree, he had a "pretty good view" of the Bates house from
his window (Tr. 12-9, p. 65).
As he sat at the window, he was aware that law
enforcement officers surrounded the house.

He had watched news

reports on television, and knew that officers were located down
below (Tr. 12-9, p. 62). [The Bates and Jepsen houses were
located down below and to the west were the Bates and Jepsen
houses - See Exhibit D-l for elevation indicators showing ground
slopes down to the west from the Singer house.] (See also Exhibit
E-7, audio tape of Defendant's statements to officers.)
Defendant told the agents that just before he fired he
saw the door to the Bates house open and close, then saw two dogs
running up the path, heard two or three shots, and then saw the
door close. At this time he said he took his carbine and shot in
the direction of the dogs (Tr. 12-9, p. 66). He told agents that

based on the incident that happened during the night, he knew
that somebody had to be there with the dogs (Tr. 12-9, p. 84),
and that they had to be law enforcement officers (Exhibit E-7).
Finally, he told agents that he didn't need to be a good marksman
because the Lord guided him (Tr. 12-9, p. 66).
When placed in context it is clear that, at a
minimum, Defendant acted recklessly when he fired in the
direction of officers, whether or not he could see them or was
specifically aiming at them.

He could not have failed to

recognize that agents were in the Bates house.

The first

indication that agents were in the house was that the door was
open and that dogs were proceeding up a path directly in front of
the house.

Even more significantly, the Defendant acknowledged

that he saw the door close, and observed movement (Tr. 12-9, p.
79).

He also told the officers in his taped statement that he

heard shots before he fired and believed the shots came from the
Bates house because the door was open (Exhibit E-7).

Although he

now characterizes his admission that he knew that officers were
in the Bates house as the product of leading questions by the
agents, the record does not bear him out.

Defendant in his brief

also asserts that he indicated (presumably to officers) that he
was not actually aware, but ought to have been aware, that people
were in his line of fire.

No such statement was ever made by the

Defendant to any agent in this case.
In assessing his conduct, it should also be noted that
the Defendant certainly knew that officers were down in the

Jepsen house, which was in a direct line of fire to the west of
the Bates house.

Officers had been stationed in the Jepsen house

throughout the 13-day standoff, and were seen on several
occasions by the occupants of the Singer property (Tr. 12-2, pp.
237, 251; Exhibit E-7).
The pattern of shots fired by the Defendant is telling.
He put four rounds through the front door of the Bates house in a
very tight pattern.

The door was partially open and these four

shots all struck the door at lethal levels (Exhibit B-23).
Officer House, who was located just to the side of the open door,
and who had opened it, was struck by one of the initial rounds
which the Defendant fired (Tr. 12-7, pp. 151-152).

Two more

rounds which the Defendant fired went just to the left of the
open doorway, one ricocheting off the south side of the Bates
house and one striking the kitchen window of the Jepsen house,
which went through the wall and hit Agent Don Roberts, who was
knocked to the ground (Tr. 12-8, pp. 12-13, 17-32).
Perhaps more telling even than the pattern is the
timing of the shots, apparent from reviewing the videotape which
was taken during the shootout by a reserve deputy from the Summit
County Sheriff's Office (Exhibit E-4).

In that videotape, one

can clearly hear the sequence of the shots fired.

After the

first three shots which the Defendant fired in rapid succession,
the agents in the Bates house fired at Addam Swapp, who had
turned towards the Bates house and shouldered his weapon.

After

those simultaneous shots, the Defendant fired four more times.

These shots, as evidenced by the videotape, are more deliberate
than the first, and are evenly spaced•

They are the rounds that

continued to impact into the Bates house while Agent McKinney was
trying to get to Fred House to render assistance and first aid
(Tr. 12-7, pp. 99-100).

(The final three shots audible on the

tape were apparently fired by Jonathan Swapp from a position
outside the northwest corner of the Singer house, as explained
above.)
These last four rounds which the Defendant fired belie
his characterization that he was just firing at dogs unaware that
men were behind them.

The dogs never keyed on their targets and

only went out a short distance.

They never got near the Swapp

brothers and reentered the Bates house before the agents closed
the door.

Yet the Defendant put four rounds in a tight pattern

through the partially open door of the Bates house while agents
were scrambling to attend Officer House (Tr. 12-7, p. 100;
Exhibit B-23).
The Defendant's actions, including his continuing to
direct shots down towards the Bates house after the initial
volley was fired, are the best indicator of his state of mind.
Firing a deadly weapon under such circumstances, even if one
accepts his claim that he was not shooting at or attempting to
harm any person, is clearly reckless.
Defendant cites State v. Howard/ 597 P.2d 878 (Utah
1979), for the proposition that the focus of the inquiry in a
negligent homicide case is the intended and not the actual victim

of the defendant•

While Howard does discuss negligent homicide,

it is in the context of the trial court's refusal to give a
negligent homicide instruction, which the court upheld, since the
evidence did not support it. Howard involved a second degree
murder and manslaughter conviction where the defendant aimed at
one person and hit another, thereby invoking the doctrine of
transferred intent.

Ld. at 881. That doctrine is inapplicable

to the present case, since the Defendant has always asserted that
he did not intend to shoot at anyone.
The jury verdict in this case gave the Defendant the
benefit of the doubt that he may not have been directly firing at
officers with the intent to kill or injure them, but his conduct
of firing his rifle cannot be characterized as anything less than
reckless.

The trial court may have been justified in not even

instructing the jury on negligent homicide, given the evidence
presented at trial, since under no rational view of the evidence
could the Defendant's conduct have constituted only criminal
negligence.

State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 453 (Utah 1986).

The jury rejected Defendant's claim that he was guilty
of nothing more than negligent homicide, and convicted him of
manslaughter.

That verdict is supported by the evidence and

should not be disturbed on appeal.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS
HE MADE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS SINCE
SUCH STATEMENTS WERE NEITHER INVOLUNTARY NOR
TAKEN IN VIOLATION OF HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS.
After being taken into custody, Defendant Singer was
transported from Marion to Salt Lake City by agents of the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (hereafter "A.T.F."), Allan
Galyan and Felix Garcia (R. 1476, p. 196). Both agents were
introduced to the defendant as A.T.F. agents prior to leaving
Marion to drive to Salt Lake City (R. 1476, p. 197). Agent
Galyan was wearing an A.T.F. raid jacket which had a badge in the
upper left-hand corner in the front and the initials A.T & F. on
the back (R. 1476, p. 197). Agent Garcia was wearing a rain
jacket with a United States Treasury seal and the letters A.T.F.
on both the front and back (R. 1476, p. 225). Agent Galyan
showed the Defendant his badge and his credentials (R. 1476, p.
197).

He advised the Defendant of his rights as per Miranda by

reading to him A.T.F. form 3200.4, "Waiver of Right to Remain
Silent and of Right to Advice of Counsel" (Exhibit C-10)(R. 1476,
p. 198). Galyan discussed each paragraph of the statement of
right portion of the form with the Defendant to verify he
understood his rights. He had the defendant read along as he
read the form, and also had him read the form himself, partly out
loud so that Galyan could verify that the Defendant could read
(R. 1476, pp. 198-199).

Agent Galyan went beyond what was on the

form and discussed each paragraph with the defendant as he read

it (R. 1476, pp. 213-214)•

The Defendant stated that he

understood his rights and then signed the statement of rights
portion of the form (R. 1476, p. 199). The time was about 10:02
a.m. (Exhibit C-10).
Galyan then told the Defendant that he wanted to talk
to him about the bombing of the church and events that occurred
around his residence since the time of the bombing (R. 14 76, p.
200).

The Defendant stated he would answer some of the

questions, at which time he signed the waiver portion of the form
(R. 1476, pp. 199-200).

Galyan then asked the Defendant what he

knew about the church bombing.
know?

What do you know?

answer them.'1

The Defendant stated, "What do I

You ask the questions and see if I can

He thereafter responded to certain questions about

the bombing (R. 1476, pp. 201-202).
About seven minutes after the questioning began, the
Defendant told Galyan that he didn't know if he felt like talking
to him (R. 1476, p. 202), at which point Galyan stopped talking
to him (R. 1476, pp. 202, 222). After a brief period of silence,
Agent Garcia engaged Galyan and then the Defendant in casual
conversation, such as mentioning that he, Garcia, was very tired
and would be glad to get back home to his family in Texas (R.
1476, p. 223).
About three minutes into such casual conversation, at
about 10:12 a.m., the Defendant told the agents that maybe he
would tell them the whole story (R. 1476, p. 203). During the
three minute period, no promises or threats were made in order to

persuade the Defendant to make any statements, nor was he misled
or tricked by the agents (R. 1476, pp. 203, 224). Further, Agent
Garcia did not ask any questions whatsoever of an investigative
nature during this brief period of time (R. 1476, pp. 237-238).
After indicating his willingness to discuss the
incidents, and during the rest of the drive down to Salt Lake,
the Defendant spoke freely and answered questions from Agent
Garcia, who asked most of the questions (R. 1476, p. 224). The
Defendant appeared calm and cooperative (R. 1476, p. 204), and
seemed to want to talk and get things off his chest (R. 1476, p.
224) .
After they reached Salt Lake City, the agents took the
Defendant to the United States Marshal's Office, where they met
two agents of the Utah State Attorney General's Office, Ron
Miller and Sharon Esplin (R. 1476, p. 226). Miller and Esplin
were there for the purpose of conducting a taped interview with
the Defendant, which was commenced at about 11:39 a.m. (R. 1476,
p. 226). As the interview began, Miller and Esplin introduced
themselves to the Defendant, and Garcia, who was also present,
stated, "okay, as the other agent and I came in, we read you your
rights.

You are aware of your rights, is this correct?"

Defendant responded, "Right."

Garcia then said, "Okay.

The
We told

you that when we got here we would want to write down what you
told us. . . ."

To which the Defendant also responded "Right."

Garcia asked him to relate to the State agents the same things
they had been talking about in the car on the way down from

Marion.

The Defendant indicated to "go ahead and ask questions,"

after which the interview proceeded (Exhibit E-7).
Garcia then asked questions, after which Miller did
some questioning, and the interview concluded at about 1:18 p.m.
(R. 1476, p. 226). The Defendant spoke freely and responded to
questions (R. 1476, pp. 227, 245). At one point in the interview
Miller asked the Defendant if he would like to take a food break,
which he declined (R. 1476, pp. 228, 245). Miller asked him if
it was all right to continue, and the Defendant said it was (R.
1476, p. 246).
At no time were any threats or promises made to the
Defendant (R. 1476, pp. 203, 224). At no time did he request
counsel (R. 1476, pp. 204, 225, 245). None of the agents who
interviewed the Defendant perceived him as either confused or
mentally retarded (R. 1476, pp. 204-205, 225-226, 247). Agent
Garcia, who participated in both interviews, testified that the
way the Defendant spoke during the taped interview was the exact
way he discussed the events in the car earlier on the way down to
Salt Lake (R. 1476, p. 227).
Prior to trial, Defendant Singer filed a motion to
suppress his statements to the agents (R. 228-229), and a
transcript of a prior evidentiary hearing in Federal Court was
admitted into evidence by stipulation (Tr. 11-16, p. 4). At that
prior hearing, the Defendant testified.

Although the Defendant

claimed that he had been confused as to whether the agents to
whom he made statements were police officers (R. 1476, pp. 110-
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At the hearing the Defendant also called Dr. Michael
DeCaria, a clinical psychologist, in support of his position that
he was borderline retarded, easily manipulated, severely
deficient in his ability to make decisions based on rational
intellect, well below average in his ability to exercise free
will, and unable to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of
constitutional rights (R. 1476, pp. 141, 143-145, 147).
Dr. DeCaria's testimony was effectively discredited on
cross-examination during which he admitted that certain low
scores on the WAIS-R intelligence (I.Q.) test could be accounted
for due to the Defendant's socially and educationally deprived
background (R. 1476, pp. 150-151), that he had never listened to
the tape of the interview between the Defendant and the agents
(R. 1476, p. 154), that in his review of the transcript of such
tape, he acknowledged that Defendant was able to comprehend
questions and communicate with officers (R. 1476, p. 154), that
he administered no tests to defendant concerning his ability to
comprehend the Miranda warning or its import (R. 1476, p. 154),
and that the Defendant was not of such low level of intelligence
that he was unable to understand what the Miranda warning meant
(R. 1476, p. 155).
On the issue of bias, Dr. DeCaria admitted that he
testified extensively and exclusively on behalf of criminal
defendants in cases where criminal responsibility is at issue (R.
1476, p. 159), and that in his entire career he had never
testified concerning a defendant's state of mind when it was not

favorable to the defense (R. 1476, p. 163). In fact, when pushed
on cross-examination, he estimated that he had testified on
behalf of criminal defendants a couple of hundred times (R. 1476,
p. 164).
In addition to cross-examination of Dr. DeCaria, the
State called Dr. Doris Read, a clinical psychologist, to rebut
DeCaria's testimony.

Dr. Read, in addition to personally

interviewing and testing the Defendant (R. 1476, p. 166-167),
also had access to the psychological tests administered by Dr.
DeCaria (R. 1476, p. 167), an I.Q. and educational evaluation
which Dr. Victor Cline had performed on the Singer children in
1977 (R. 1476, p. 167), information from the Defendant's former
tutor (R. 1476, p. 171), reports from Agents Galyan and Garcia
who interviewed the Defendant in the car on the way down to Salt
Lake City (R. 1476, p. 178), as well as copies of the tapes and
transcripts of the Defendant's interview in Salt Lake City with
Agent Garcia and Agent Ron Miller of the Attorney General's
Office (R. 1476, p. 167).
Among the tests which Dr. Read administered to the
Defendant was one to specifically test his comprehension of the
Miranda rights (R. 1476, p. 168). After responding appropriately
to the first inquiry concerning his comprehension of those
rights, the Defendant cut off the test, which further indicated
to Dr. Read that he indeed understood the concept of his right to
remain silent and was able to exert that right during the test
itself (R. 1476, p. 173).

Further, from her study of all the materials provided,
including Dr. Cline's 1977 report documenting the decline in I.Q.
testing on the part of all the Singer children after they were
taken from the public schools, Dr. Read concluded that it was
likely that the Defendant's present low scores on the WAIS-R test
did not accurately reflect his true level of intellectual
functioning, but that such scores were likely the result of his
intellectual deprivation and the lack of stimulation occasioned
by his parents' withdrawing of the children from the public
school system (R. 1476, pp. 172, 175). She indicated that the
WAIS-R test is very highly correlated with academic performance
and academic achievement (R. 1476, p. 175). Notably, in 1977,
the Defendant's score on the WAIS-R test was higher, with his
full scale score being 83, which was in the low average range (R.
1476, p. 173).
Dr. Read also testified that she reviewed the MMPI test
administered by Dr. DeCaria, and that it showed an essentially
normal profile (R. 1476, p. 174), contrary to Dr. DeCaria's
assertion that it showed an abnormal profile (R. 1476, p. 155).
She also found that Dr. DeCaria had failed to administer one
subtest on the MMPI test, the object assembly test, and that
after she had the Defendant perform that test, it brought up his
performance I.Q. score into the low average range from the
borderline mentally retarded level scored by Dr. DeCaria (R.
1476, pp. 170-171).

On the issue of the Defendant's submissiveness, Dr.
Read found contradictory evidence, some suggesting that he was
gullible and some suggesting that he was very suspicious and
mistrustful (R. 1476, p. 183).
Dr. Read further concluded there was no evidence to
suggest that the Defendant was unable to comprehend the warnings
he received from the officers, or that he was even particularly
emotionally stressed during the taped interview wherein he
appeared quite composed, able to comprehend all questions, able
to give logical responses to the agents' questions, including the
recollection of detail, and that, in short, there was nothing to
indicate that his cognitive faculties were in any way impaired
(R. 1476, pp. 174-176).
Further, Dr. Read testified that, contrary to his
testimony at the hearing, the Defendant told her that he did
understand the form which he read and which the officers read to
him at the time he signed the Miranda waiver form (R. 1476, p.
179).

She also noted from the officers' reports that the Miranda

warning was not just read by the Defendant off the form, but read
to him by the officers, who took time to explain to him exactly
what it meant (R. 1476, p. 182). This was corroborated by the
testimony of Agent Allan Galyan of A.T.F. during his testimony at
the hearing (R. 1476, pp. 198-200, 213-214).
In addition to Dr. Read and Agent Galyan, Agent Felix
Garcia of A.T.F. (R. 1476, pp. 219-240) and Agent Ronald Miller
of the Utah Attorney General's Office (R. 1476, pp. 240-251) were

called as witnesses and testified at the hearing consistent with
the above-described narrative of events.
After reviewing the transcript of the pretrial hearing,
as well as the tape of the Defendant's statements to Agent Miller
and Agent Garcia, together with a transcript thereof, the trial
court concluded that the statements were voluntarily made by the
Defendant in compliance with his Miranda rights, and therefore
denied his motion to suppress (Tr. 11-18, pp. 147-150).
A.

VOLUNTARINESS OF STATEMENTS

All statements made by the Defendant concerning the
events which had transpired were made after a full and complete
written and oral acknowledgment by the Defendant that he
understood his rights and was willing to waive them.

Agent

Galyan went through them individually and exhaustively with the
Defendant at the time he first came into contact with him in
Marion.
The determination of the voluntariness of a confession
or admission requires the Court to consider the "totality of all
the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the
accused and the details of the interrogation."

Schneckloth v.

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); State v. Hegelman, 717 P.2d 1348
(Utah 1986); State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233 (Utah 1985).

The

voluntariness of a confession need be established only by a
preponderance of the evidence, Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477
(1972); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986); State v.
Moore, 697 P.2d at 236.

In looking at the circumstances of the instant case, it
is clear that the police conduct was free from the abuses that so
concerned the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).

The period of interrogation was not unusually long, no

threats or promises were made to induce the Defendant to talk, he
was fully advised of his rights and expressly waived them upon
his initial contact with the agents, and later acknowledged that
he was still aware of his rights when he was interviewed at the
Marshal's office in Salt Lake City.

The one time when he

indicated he did not feel like talking with Agents Galyan and
Garcia in the car, they ceased interrogation.

While Garcia did

engage the Defendant in casual conversation after a brief period
of silence, such conversation was neither interrogation nor its
functional equivalent since it was not likely to evoke an
incriminating response from the Defendant.

Not every question

posed in a custodial setting is equivalent to interrogation, but
only those reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses.
[Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).]

United States

v. Gonzales-Mares, 752 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 47
U.S. 913 (1985).
In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), the United
States Supreme Court differentiated between a suspect's
invocation of his right to silence and that of his right to
counsel, and set a higher standard for the government to meet in
demonstrating a valid waiver of the right to counsel, once
invoked.

Thus an accused may not be subject to further

interrogation until counsel has been made available to him,
unless the accused himself initiates further communication with
the police.

Even under the higher standard of Edwards, which is

not applicable here since the defendant never invoked his right
to counsel, police are not deemed to impermissibly "initiate"
renewed interrogation by engaging in routine conversation with a
suspect about unrelated matters.

451 U.S. at 490 (Powell, J.,

concurring).
Further, the fact that Agent Garcia may have been
friendly and congenial while making casual conversation with the
Defendant as they rode in the car does not render the Defendant's
subsequent statements coerced or involuntary.

Miller v. Fenton,

796 F.2d 598 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 989 (1986).

In

Miller, the police officer's words of comfort (You're not a
criminal") and frequent repetition of assurances ("We're going to
see that you get the proper help") to make the defendant feel
more comfortable about speaking to the officer did not render his
subsequent confession involuntary, where it was found to
nevertheless be the product of the defendant's own desire to
talk.

Id. at 611-612.

In the instant case Agent Garcia made no

such assurances, promises, or misrepresentations to the Defendant
during the three minutes in question (Tr. 1476, p. 51). He
simply engaged in a casual conversation and treated the Defendant
like he would treat anybody else (Tr. 1476, p. 234). After a
brief period of casual conversation, the Defendant volunteered
that maybe he would tell the agents the whole story (Tr. 1476, p,

203).

The facts do not support Defendant's claim that his

confession was coerced through friendly manipulation by Agent
Garcia or that his statements were made involuntarily.
Further, the Defendant's possible ignorance of the full
consequences of his decision to waive his rights does not vitiate
the voluntariness of his statements.

Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.

298 (1985); see also, Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987).
Nor is voluntariness vitiated by any moral or psychological
pressures to talk emanating from sources other than official
coercion.

Elstad, 470 U.S. at 304-305.

It is sufficient that

the waiver is a product of free and deliberate choice rather than
intimidation, coercion or deception.

Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.

412 (1986).
Finally, to the extent the Defendant may be claiming
his statements were involuntary due to any mental illness or
deficiency on his part, a recent United States Supreme Court case
is instructive.

In Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986),

the defendant confessed to a murder after receiving his Miranda
warning and waiving his rights.

Shortly thereafter, he was sent

to the state hospital after he became visibly disoriented during
an interview.

A psychiatrist discovered that the defendant

believed he was following the voice of God in confessing, and
based upon the psychiatrist's testimony that the defendant
suffered from a psychosis that interfered with his ability to
make free and rational choices, the trial court suppressed his
confession despite the fact the police had done nothing wrong or

coercive in securing the confession.

The court also found that

the defendant's mental state vitiated his attempted waiver of the
right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination.

The

Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Federal
Constitution required suppression of a confession when the
defendant's mental state interfered with his "rational intellect"
and "free will."
The United States Supreme Court reversed, stating:
We think that the Supreme Court of
Colorado erred in importing into this area of
constitutional law notions of "free will"
that have no place there. There is obviously
no reason to require more in the way of a
"voluntariness" inquiry in the Miranda waiver
context than in the Fourteenth Amendment
confession context. The sole concern of the
Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was basedf
is governmental coercion. See United States
v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977);
Miranda, supra, [384 U.S.], at 460. Indeed,
the Fifth Amendment privilege is not
concerned "with moral and psychological
pressures to confess emanating from sources
other than official coercion." Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985). The
voluntariness of a waiver of this privilege
has always depended on the absence of police
overreaching, not on "free choice" in any
broader sense of the word. . . .
479 U.S. at 169-170.
The Supreme Court went on to state:
Respondent urges this Court to adopt his
"free will" rationale, and to find an
attempted waiver invalid whenever the
defendant feels compelled to waive his rights
by reason of any compulsion, even if the
compulsion does not flow from the police.
But such a treatment of the waiver issue
would "cut this Court's holding in [Miranda]
completely loose from its own explicitly

stated rationale." Beckwith v. United
States, 425 U.S. 341, 345, (1976). Miranda
protects defendants against government
coercion leading them to surrender rights
protected by the Fifth Amendment; it goes no
further than that. Respondent's perception
of coercion flowing from the "voice of God,"
however important or significant such a
perception may be in other disciplines, is a
matter to which the United States
Constitution does not speak.
479 U.S. at 170-171.
Thus, even in cases involving mentally deficient
defendants, coercive government misconduct is necessary to
establish involuntariness of a statement.
The Defendant's characterization of his low level of
intelligence, gullibility and lack of understanding of the
Miranda warning were matters which were in dispute at the
hearing.

The Court was not obligated to accept the Defendant's

self-serving claims in this regard.

There was ample evidence

presented at the hearing to justify the Court's factual finding
that the Defendant's admissions were voluntarily made, thus
rejecting his claim that he was particularly susceptible to
subtle police influence which he claims existed and which he
claimed rendered his statements involuntary.
The Court should employ a "clearly erroneous" standard
of review as to the lower court's factual finding on the issues
of whether the police used coercive tactics and whether the
Defendant was particularly susceptible to any such tactics.
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert.
granted,

P.2d

, (Utah 1989).

In the instant case, the

trial court concluded that the officers did not engage in any
trickery, coercion, psychological pressure, or the like.

(Tr.

11-18, p. 148).
Applying the above authority to the facts of the
instant case, it is clear that there was ample evidence to
support the trial court's ruling that the Defendant's statements
were freely and voluntarily made (Tr. 11-18, p. 148).
B.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

The Miranda decision requires that a person in custody
prior to being interrogated be advised of his rights under the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments under circumstances where any
subsequent waiver of those rights is voluntary, knowing and
intelligent.

Johnson v. Zerbstf 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1968).

A suspect must in some manner affirmatively invoke his
right to silence or counsel.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,

473 (1966); United States v. Bosbe# 675 F.2d 1174, 1182 n.13
(11th Cir. 1982); State v. Hegelman, 717 P.2d 1348 (Utah 1986).
A waiver need not always be explicit, but may be established
through understanding of rights and a particular course of
conduct.

North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979); State v.

Hegelman, 717 P.2d at 1349.
The court must look at the totality of the
circumstances to determine if a valid waiver has been made.

Fare

v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979); State v. Hegelman, 717
P.2d at 1349. A waiver of Miranda rights need be established
only by a preponderance of the evidence.

Colorado v. Connelly,

only by a preponderance of the evidence.
479 U.S. at 168-169.

Colorado v. Connelly,

Finally, Miranda principles do not apply to

volunteered statements of the accused made without interrogation.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 478.
In this case, there can be little doubt as to the
sufficiency of the initial advisement and waiver of rights which
is described above and which occurred between the Defendant and
Agent Galyan.

After going over the document carefully and

completely, the Defendant signed both the acknowledgment of
understanding and waiver section of the form.

As the United

States Supreme Court stated in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412
(1986):
Once it is determined that a suspect's
decision not to rely on his rights was
uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could
stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he
was aware of the State's intention to use his
statements to secure a conviction, the
analysis is complete and the waiver is valid
as a matter of law. . . .
475 U.S. at 422-423 (footnote omitted).
After about seven minutes of questioning about the
bombing of the Mormon church, the Defendant told the agents that
he didn't feel like talking to them (R. 1476, p. 202). Although
questioning ceased concerning the bombing or any other criminal
offenses, Agent Garcia, after a short period of silence, did
engage in casual conversation with Agent Galyan and the Defendant
(R. 1476, p. 223). Within three minutes the Defendant said maybe
he would tell them the story, which he proceeded to do (R. 1476,
p. 203).

There is an initial question whether the Defendant's
statement to Agent Galyan that he didn't know if he felt like
talking to him was an invocation of his fifth amendment right.
If one assumes that it was, the doctrine of Michigan v. Mosley,
423 U.S. 96 (1975), comes into play.
In Mosley, the Supreme Court dealt with the situation
where the accused invoked his right to remain silent (as opposed
to his right to counsel as per Edwards v. Arizona).

In holding

admissible a subsequent custodial statement by the defendant, the
Court emphasized that the defendant's right to cut off
questioning was "scrupulously honored," notwithstanding the fact
that he was interrogated two hours after invoking his rights by
other officers who re-advised him of his rights.
Unlike the per se proscription in cases where the right
to counsel is invoked (Edwards), the Court has laid down no such
rigid rule governing re-questioning of a suspect who initially
invokes his right to remain silent.
F.2d 1185 (2d Cir. 1978).

Wilson v. Henderson, 584

The question is whether under all the

circumstances it can be said that the resumption of questioning
is consistent with scrupulous observance of the right to cut off
questioning.

United States v. Mearns, 443 F.Supp. 1244, 1253

(D. Del. 1978); Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d at 1187.
In the instant case the Defendant, not pursuant to
interrogation by the agents, volunteered that maybe he would tell
them the story (R. 1476, p. 203). This occurred about three
minutes after he stated he didn't feel like talking to them and

less than fifteen minutes from having extensively reviewed his
rights with Agent Galyan and having signed the acknowledgment and
waiver form (R. 1476, pp. 202-203; Exhibit C-10).
Under the circumstances where the agents did no more
than engage in casual conversation not related to a criminal
investigation during the three minute period, they did
"scrupulously honor" the Defendant's right to cut off questioning
at any time.

This is especially true under the circumstances

where the agents were involved in transporting the Defendant to
Salt Lake City and some casual conversation would be normal and
expected.
As discussed above, not all conversations or questions
posed in a custodial setting are the equivalent of interrogation,
but only those reasonably likely to elicit incriminating
responses.

Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02.

This is not a case in which the defendant was badgered
or his will was overborne by persistent or coercive questioning.
United States v. Badr, 604 F.Supp. 569 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).

When one

combines the Defendant's explicit waiver less than fifteen
minutes earlier with his course of conduct in suggesting that he
might tell the agents the story and then doing so, it seems clear
that at that time he re-initiated conversation concerning the
offenses and waived his right to remain silent.
In Holloway v. United States, 495 F.2d 835 (10th Cir.
1974), the defendant, who had invoked his right to remain silent
and thereafter initiated conversations with the police as he was

being transported in a vehicle, was deemed to have thereby
validly waived his rights to remain silent.

The Court emphasized

that the admissions made by the defendant were not the
consequence of a formal and controlled interrogation in its
classic sense, there was no evidence that the agents pressed an
interrogation upon the defendant against his wishes, and the
defendant had been fully advised of his rights three or four
hours earlier.

1^. at 837-839.

A similar waiver should be found by the Court in the
instant case where the Defendant was fully advised of his rights
only ten minutes before, where he himself re-initiated
conversation about the events during the course of casual
conversation with the agents after they had ceased questioning,
and where he spoke freely and openly in a manner consistent with
his own desire to talk.
Once the agents and defendant arrived in Salt Lake
City, the Defendant was introduced to Attorney General
investigators and was again reminded of his rights prior to the
taking of a taped statement, at which time he acknowledged his
rights again and spoke freely to the agents during the taped
interview.
In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), the Supreme
Court held that not all Miranda rule violations are Fifth
Amendment violations, and thus a suspect who has once responded
to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled
from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given
the requisite Miranda warnings.

470 U.S. at 318.

In the instant case where the warnings were fully given
at the outset and where no coercive questioning occurred in the
car on the way down to the city, there should certainly be no
suppression of the Defendant's taped statement under the
circumstances where he was again reminded at the outset of the
interview of the rights he had gone over less than two hours
earlier, and where he thereafter agreed to be questioned.
Looking at the totality of the circumstances, it is
clear that there was ample evidence to support the trial court's
finding that the Defendant's statements were not taken in
violation of Miranda, and that when the right to remain silent
was invoked, it was honored by the officers (Tr. 11-18, p. 148).
CONCLUSION
The Defendant convicted for Manslaughter is supported
by sufficient evidence, and the trial court properly denied his
motion to suppress the statements he voluntarily made to agents
after waiving his rights.

DATED this ^ '

J

His conviction should be upheld.

day of October, 1990.
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